Part 4: What Really Happened

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First Lieutenant Clifford A. Gehrt

Introduction

In 2024, Roger Lockshier, a crew chief in Cpt. Fry’s helicopter gunship platoon during the Vietnam War wrote a book titled Saving Infantry and SOG Souls: A Crew Chief’s View. In his book, Roger recounts his experiences during the Vietnam War and includes a chapter detailing the flight that earned Cpt. Fry a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). As a result of the publicity surrounding Roger’s book, I decided to make another effort to have Cpt. Fry’s DSC upgraded to the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH).

Background: From 2017 to 2020, I worked with a group of Vietnam veterans and friends in an effort to have Cpt. Fry’s DSC upgraded to the CMH. At that time, we made no effort to garner public support. Now that Roger Lockshier’s book has made the public aware of the miscarriage of justice associated with our earlier efforts, I have organized this website not only to tell the story of our multi-year upgrade effort, but also to highlight what I believe is discrimination against all Vietnam veterans. Regarding the latter, I have initiated an internet petition to request that the Secretary of the Army direct an investigation into the Army Human Resources Command's (HRC) handling of award upgrade requests.

What Really Happened

1. Sometime after the battle covered in Part 1 of this website, and the support provided Cpt. Davin’s company by the Black Angel Gunships, covered in Part 2, Cpt. Davin let it be known he intended to nominate Cpt. Fry for the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH). As a result, Cpt. Fry’s aviation company deferred to Cpt. Davin’s request. However, they started processing the nominations for Cpt. Fry’s crew members through 101st aviation channels.

2. After the infantry unit initially requested a statement from a crew member of each aircraft involved in the mission, they moved forward with their nomination without further coordination with Cpt. Fry’s aviation company. However, further coordination with the Black Angel company would have been difficult, if not impossible, because before the nomination process was completed, Cpt. Fry’s aviation company was deactivated as part of the 101st Airborne Division’s conversion to an Airmobile Division and the establishment of the new 160th Aviation Group.

3. That conversion resulted not only in Cpt. Fry’s aviation company being deactivated, its personnel and equipment were transferred to other units within the division and the newly created 160th Aviation Group. Cpt. Fry’s Black Angel Gun Platoon was relocated from Camp Eagle to LZ Sally, where it became part of a newly formed gunship company, and its call sign changed from Black Angel to Hawk. Even if the 1/505 had tried to involve the former Black Angel Company in preparing their nomination, it is doubtful they would have found anyone to coordinate with.

4. Not only did the administrative disruptions caused by the reorganization of the 101st affect Cpt. Fry’s nomination, but it also impacted the awarding of the Silver Star to his co-pilot, Mr. Whitman. The action took place on April 4, 1968, but the orders to award Mr. Whitman the Silver Star were not issued until May 27, 1969, fourteen months later. In contrast, when Cpt. Fry was nominated for a Silver Star for a different action, it took just over two months from submission to approval and the issuance of orders.

5. One of the comments in Cpt. Davin’s handwritten nomination was:

What these pilots and crew did for my company and me is truly an act deserving of the highest award for gallantry.

6. After the company clerk received Cpt. Davin’s statement, he typed it on a U.S. Army Republic of Vietnam (USAVN) Form 157-R (Recommendation for Decoration for Valor or Merit). The same form he used for the nine Silver Star nominations he was preparing for Cpt. Davin. However, rather than checking the box for the Silver Star, he checked the box for “the highest award for gallantry,” the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

7. On the USAVN Form 157-R, the highest award for gallantry was the DSC. The CMH was not an option on the USAVN Form 157-R. In fact, the 157-R was the wrong form; it was only used for awards that could be approved in Vietnam, the DSC being the highest. The correct form for the CMH nomination was the DA Form 638 (Recommendation For Award), as the CMH was not approved in Vietnam. When a pilot from the 1st Air Cavalry Division, operating in the same area during the same timeframe, was nominated for the CMH, the 1st Cavalry Division used the DA Form 638, and he eventually received the CMH. For a description of the action that earned the 1st Cavalry Division pilot a CMH, click here. [Link to description]

8. Considering the administrative burden placed on Cpt. Davin, his company clerk, and the 1/505 Infantry staff, it is remarkable that they managed to even process a nomination for Cpt. Fry, who was not even a member of their command. With ten men killed and twenty-three wounded, there were thirty-three casualty reports to process, letters of condolence to be written, other recommendations for awards to be processed, and the personal equipment of those who were killed or evacuated needed to be processed (inventoried and shipped), among the many other tasks that Cpt. Davin’s company and the 1/505 Infantry were not really staffed to deal with. There was also the fact that the 82nd Airborne had only recently arrived in Vietnam, so everything was new to them. Most importantly, both the 3rd Brigade and the 1/501 were heavily involved in combat operations, so naturally, paperwork had to take a back seat to the war and supporting the immediate needs of the combat units and the warfighters.

9. Sometime during the preparation of the awards Form 157-R, a statement was received from one crew member of each of the Black Angel gunships involved in the action. Those three statements were added to a statement prepared by the Air Force weatherman assigned to the 101st Airborne Division. Once all four statements were collected and attached to the Form 157-R, an off-center facsimile of Cpt. Davin's signature was taped to the recommender line, and it was forwarded up through the chain of command to the US Army Vietnam Headquarters as a DSC nomination, not a CMH nomination.* Cpt. Davin was clearly unaware that his nomination had been processed as a DSC nomination rather than a CMH because 50 years later, he still believes an awards board downgraded his CMH nomination. If he had signed the Form 157-R, he would have known his nomination went forward as a DSC nomination, not as a CMH nomination.

*The fact that a facsimile was attached is evident on the copy of the 157-R recovered from the National Archives. More than likely, a facsimile was used because company commanders remained in the field with their companies and rarely made it back to the rear area.

10. Once the Form 157-R went forward to the Commander, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, for review, he approved what he mistakenly thought was a DSC nomination being submitted by Cpt. Davin. As for his review, Cpt. Davin’s company was under the operational control of another brigade operating outside of his brigade's operational area during the period covered by the nomination, so it is unlikely his brigade commander had personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the action when he recommended approval for a DSC.

11. As for the documents available for the brigade commander’s review, Block-17 of the Form 157-R contains a list of the eyewitness statements attached to the nomination and available for the brigade commander to review. That block only shows four eyewitness statements totaling five pages. However, three of those four statements did not cover all phases of the action. One statement came from an Air Force weatherman, confirming that the weather was bad; another was from the crew chief of the third gunship, which left the contact area before the second medevac arrived; the third was written by one of the pilots of the second gunship, who returned to Camp Eagle after Cpt. Fry departed the contact area with his first load of wounded. None of those witnesses were in the contact area when Cpt. Fry and his crew returned for the second load of wounded, nor were they aware of what transpired inside of Cpt. Fry’s aircraft. The two-page statement from Cpt. Fry's copilot, Mr. Wittman, was included as an attachment, but the eight pages of statements prepared by the other crew members were not. Additionally, the Black Angel company executive officer’s report on the “Aviation Aspect of the Fireteam Mission” was also excluded. To view Mr. Wittman’s statement and the missing company executive officer report, click here. [Link to statements]

12. Considering the evidence available in the Form 157-R, recovered from the National Archives, it is clear that during this first step in the adjudicating process of the nomination, not only was relevant material not available to the reviewer, but at the first level of the chain of command, the reviewing officer did not know that Cpt. Davin’s intent was to nominate Cpt. Fry for the CMH and not a DSC.

13. After the brigade commander approved the administrative-error-produced DSC nomination, it was forwarded to the 101st Airborne Division with its listed enclosures. Had the division awards and decoration section known the original nomination was for the CMH, they would have advised the brigade they used the wrong form, but they had no way of knowing the original nomination was for the CMH.

14. Concerning the division commander’s review, he also did not see the missing documents as they were not listed as enclosures on the division letter of transmittal forwarding the nomination to XXIV Corps. That letter of transmittal stated: “1 Encl: NC,” which means “1 Enclosure: No Changes.” The one enclosure would have been the Form 157-R with its listed enclosures received from the 82nd Airborne Division, with nothing added. If the missing documents had become available for review at the division level, they would have been listed as additions in the letter of transmittal from the 101st to the XXIV Corps. The use of “NC” verifies that the critical documents were never seen at the division level.

15. After the Form 157-R forwarding the DSC nomination arrived at the U.S. Army Republic of Vietnam Headquarters (USARV), it should have gone before an awards board that had the authority to recommend an upgrade. However, no evidence exists that the Form 157-R ever went before an official awards board at USARV. The Awards Board Summary Sheet (USARV Form 115), obtained from the National Archives, contains no evidence that a properly constituted and fully operational awards board ever adjudicated the nomination or made a recommendation. The summary sheet has no names or signatures indicating the nomination was ever properly reviewed and approved. The findings of a properly constituted and operational awards board for the 1st Air Cavalry Division pilot mentioned above and the incomplete (USARV Form 115) of Cpt. Fry’s nomination can be seen by clicking here. [Link to forms]

16. To demonstrate that the missing documents would have made a difference, the general order awarding the Silver Star to Cpt. Fry’s co-pilot, CW1 James L. Wittman, is noteworthy. Mr. Wittman’s Silver Star Citation, prepared by Cpt. Fry, in 1968, contains 522 words describing the action, while Cpt. Fry’s DSC Citation includes only 220 words for the same event. Mr. Wittman’s Citation states that two medevac aircraft were forced away by intense enemy fire before he volunteered to land for the wounded; Cpt. Fry’s DSC Citation mentions only one medevac aircraft being forced away. Mr. Wittman’s Citation notes, “He then made two dry runs using his searchlight, repeatedly drawing fire, to ensure he would not hit any of the friendly troops in the area.” In contrast, Cpt. Fry’s Citation only indicates that he used his searchlight to “pinpoint the enemy's position.”

17. To further support the “missing documents” position, below is a comparison between the “reasons” provided for awarding the DSC and the actual events that transpired that night, based on the missing eyewitness statements and the document prepared by the aviation company executive officer, which were unavailable for review at the infantry brigade or division levels and were not assessed at the USARV Headquarters level.

18. General Orders 3125, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 13 August 1969, provided three reasons why Cpt. Fry received the DSC.

1st Reason Given

A. The first reason given in the general order was that “Cpt. Fry relieved the pressure on a besieged ground element with 'several casualties' by directing gunship fire onto enemy positions, which he pinpointed with the use of a searchlight.”

(1) The phrase “several casualties” does not accurately convey the company's urgent need for both gunship and medevac support. The initial report was six killed, sixteen wounded, and four missing. However, the bodies of the missing were recovered the next morning, making it ten killed and up to twenty-three wounded (according to Part 1: The Battle).

(2) Cpt. Fry did not “relieve the pressure on the besieged ground elements by directing gunship fire onto enemy positions, which he pinpointed with the use of a searchlight.” He used his searchlight on two simulated gun runs to confirm that the live-fire gun runs would not endanger either of the two separate companies that were dangerously close to the enemy position. He also did it to ensure his wingmen knew precisely where to place their fire, as restrictions to visibility made it nearly impossible to confirm that all eleven members of the fire team knew exactly where to direct their fire. As a further safeguard for those on the ground, once cleared to open fire, Cpt. Fry made the first two live-fire gun runs himself to create fires in the target area for his wingmen to adjust their fires on without endangering the infantry.

2nd Reason Given

B. The second reason given in the general order: “An ambulance helicopter arrived, but the pilot missed the landing zone in the darkness and set down near the enemy, who forced the craft away. At that time, Cpt. Fry volunteered to attempt the mission, and although heavy fire from the village imperiled his attempt, he succeeded in making two extractions.”

(1) That statement failed to mention that two ambulance helicopters had been driven away, not just one. It also did not mention that both were damaged by enemy fire and that a crew member of the first aircraft was wounded.

(2) Cpt. Fry did not volunteer to attempt the evacuation after “the enemy forced the craft away.” He did not volunteer until after a second ambulance helicopter arrived, was hit by enemy fire, and departed without the wounded. Then, after:

(a) The Medevac Operations Center informed Cpt. Fry that another medevac would not be sent that night.

(b) Cpt. Davin stated some of his wounded could not survive the night and insisted the gunships not depart the area without his wounded. Only then did Cpt. Fry “volunteer” to attempt the evacuation.

3rd Reason Given

C. “Cpt. Fry succeeded in making two extractions.”

(1) While it’s true that Cpt. Fry and his crew succeeded in making two extractions, that statement does not fully capture the complexity of performing those extractions that night.

(2) To execute those extractions, they first had to land in the dark with their lights off in an unprepared landing zone while under enemy fire. Regarding the takeoffs, I will cite the unseen quotes from the crew chief and the gunner on the flight.

(a) Crew Chief: "As I jumped into the aircraft, I told Cpt. Fry to take off. As we started out of the LZ, I was sure we would not get off the ground, and I still don’t see how we made it. We were so overloaded, and it seemed like an eternity before we were airborne.

(b) Gunner, concerning the first load: “After loading all the wounded we could get inside the aircraft; we started out of the LZ, and I thought for a minute we would not make it.”

(c) Gunner, concerning the second load: “Upon loading the critically wounded onto our aircraft, we tried to make it out of the LZ, and again, we were faced with the darkness and the knowledge that we were an over-loaded gunship with nine lives aboard, but once more, Cpt. Fry brought us out of the LZ.”

19. There is no way to summarize the importance of the missing report prepared by the Black Angel company executive officer on the “Aviation Aspects of the Fireteam Mission” that was not seen at the brigade and division levels. Therefore, it is transcribed in full below.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Company B (Gen. Spt.) 101st Aviation Battalion

APO San Francisco 96383

SUBJECT: Aviation Aspect of Fire Team Mission 19 June 1968

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

A review of all eyewitness statements reveals the following aviation aspects of the fire team mission in support of C/1/505 Infantry, 82nd Abn. Div., on the night of 04-April-1968.

1. The close proximity of C/1/505 Infantry to the enemy position would have indeed made the fire support mission an extremely difficult task during daylight hours. However, this mission was accomplished during extreme darkness, with very limited lighting to identify friendly elements. During the gun-runs, enemy fire was suppressed, with no friendly troops being injured by the gunship fire. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the fire team leader not only had to identify the enemy and friendly positions but also had to brief and direct the fires of eleven other members of the fire team.

2. Weather reports verify that the mission was performed in weather conditions that were far below those accepted by aviation personnel as combat essential weather minimums.

3. Either one of the above-mentioned conditions would have given the fire team leader ample justification to refuse to accept the mission for safety reasons alone.

4. The statements also indicate that the fire team leader exhibited a high degree of professionalism and understanding, being able to fully understand the tactical situation and coordinate with the ground commander[s] with minimum visual aids and directing the fire of all three ships, providing the much-needed air support without endangering the lives of the friendly forces.

5. The door gunners of the fire team displayed the highest degree of professionalism in being able to suppress the enemy fire that caused extensive damage to the medevac helicopter and nearly cost the lives of the crew. The heavy enemy fire received by both medevac helicopters clearly illustrates the close proximity of the enemy to the friendly position.

6. The fireteam leader, although fully aware of his responsibility for the safety of his crew and aircraft, landed his aircraft in a hot, unprepared area, without lighting and while under heavy enemy fire, in order to evacuate the seriously wounded personnel. The task was completely voluntary and far above and beyond the call of duty. The helicopter gunship [UH-1C] is designed to carry a maximum crew of four due to its critical weight limitations and relatively low power as compared to a medevac helicopter. The gunship, in addition to the crew of four, carried five critically wounded personnel out of that area on two occasions, which placed the aircraft in an extremely overloaded condition. This flight would have taken an exceptional degree of knowledge and professionalism, even under the most favorable flight conditions during daylight hours.

Vietnam 1967: 1/Lt. Fry stands next to his UH-1C Gunship. This picture shows the size of the UH-1C cargo compartment, a mini-gun, and the rocket pods. After the takeoff with the first load of wounded, there were eight people in the cargo compartment for a time: the crew chief, gunner, five wounded, and the co-pilot.

7. The crew further endangered their lives by surrendering all of their machine gun ammunition to the infantry personnel, who were running low on ammunition, thereby limiting their own ability to return fire while evacuating the wounded.

8. The pilots exhibited a high degree of professional flying ability by using an extremely difficult means of navigation while low level at night en route to the hospital area, necessitated by extremely poor weather.

9. Any number of existing circumstances on that night would have given the fire team leader complete justification for refusing any portion of the mission. The successful completion of a mission of this nature, under the existing conditions that night, would appear to be almost impossible. Indeed, the entire crew exemplified an exceptional degree of courage and professionalism and performed duties far above and beyond the call of duty.

Submitted by:

Francis Gniazdowski

Cpt., TC

Executive Officer

20. Fifty-one years after the above-described action, Major Paul H. Davin (USA, Retired), the ground commander, wrote the following about his 1968 nomination of Cpt. Fry for the Medal of Honor.

I have no idea how the award system works or why the decision was made to downgrade my nomination of Cpt. Fry for the CMH that I thought he deserved for his valorous action. It is difficult for me to believe that an Infantry Officer would have supported such a downgrade. The life of an infantryman in Vietnam was hard and very demanding, and he could be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice at any time. However, in recognition of his willingness to sacrifice, it was understood that if he were wounded, no effort would be spared to evacuate him from the battlefield as quickly as possible. In this case, we had a helicopter gunship pilot who honored that commitment and saved the lives of my critically wounded infantrymen. In keeping that commitment, Cpt. Fry risked his own life and performed feats of valor beyond what anyone has a right to expect, and he did it two different times under almost impossible conditions that any aviator sitting on the review board should have realized were far above and beyond the call of duty and that there is no award high enough for a proper expression of this country's deepest gratitude.

21. Finally, I will quote from my own 2019 DSC upgrade request letter, as it is a good summary of what Cpt. Fry and his crew did, and a proper closing for this memorandom.

A good analogy is that Cpt. Fry and his crew did the equivalent of diving on three separate hand grenades that failed to explode. The first was flying in adverse weather conditions below combat essential minimums to land in an unlighted landing zone with their lights off. The second was operating the helicopter gunship on the cutting edge of its design capabilities under adverse conditions, where one mistake could have been disastrous. Third was landing under the same enemy fire that had already damaged and forced two medevac aircraft to abort their recovery efforts. Finally, after surviving those three figurative hand grenades, and making it back to the safety of the rear area, they did it all over again, when asked to return for more wounded.

22. In conclusion, I would like to thank Jackie Worth for her assistance in creating this website and organizing the accompanying petition.

Link to Petition

Clifford A. Gehrt

First Lieutenant, Infantry

Former Battalion Adjutant/S-1

2nd Bn., 39th Inf. Regt., 9th Inf. Div.

Fort Riley, Kansas/Vietnam

1966–1967