Is the Army Human Resources Command discriminating against veterans of the Vietnam War?
"God and the soldier, we adore,
In time of danger, not before.
The danger passed, and all things righted,
God is forgotten, and the soldier slighted."
- Rudyard Kipling, 1899
"Stolen valor typically refers to individuals who falsely claim military honors they have not earned; conversely, when a deserving individual is denied earned recognition, I believe that is also a form of stolen valor." - Clifford A. Gehrt (2025)
Part 2: Above and Beyond
the Call of Duty
Chapter 13 of Roger Lockshier’s book focuses on the flight that led to Cpt. Fry receiving a
Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).
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April 1968 was another very active month for the Black Angel gunships of Bravo Company, 101st Aviation Battalion. Camp Eagle was up and running and in full swing. The Black Angels were conducting operations from Da Nang all the way up to Quang Tri near the DMZ and inland to the A Shau Valley and the Laotian border. A great deal of our effort was directed toward supporting infantry units in clearing the fortified villages around Hue, the former imperial capital of Vietnam. Those villages were now occupied by NVA units that had captured Hue at the start of the Tet Lunar New Year but were eventually forced out of the city by the Marines during the Tet Offensive. The area north of Hue, along Highway-1, had been christened "The Street Without Joy" by the French Army during an earlier war. From our point of view, that name still accurately describes the area.
On 4 April 1968, Captain Jerry R. Fry (call sign Black Angel 6)—our flight platoon leader and a UH-1C gunship instructor pilot—had just landed after giving a check ride to a newly assigned pilot. With the engine still running and a second pilot in the process of strapping in for a check ride, our company commander, Major Eugene Randell, approached the aircraft, saying he needed to be taken to LZ Sally ASAP. He had just been tasked with investigating a friendly fire incident where a gunship from another unit had fired into an infantry unit, and the casualties were being taken to LZ Sally's aid station.
After dropping the major off at the LZ Sally aid station medevac pad, Cpt. Fry completed the second check ride and returned to Camp Eagle to debrief the check rides and start preparing for an early morning departure on R&R. Even though he wasn't on standby when a last-light call came in for a medevac support mission north of Hue, he decided to join them.
He flew with copilot Warrant Officer-1 James L. Wittman, Crew Chief Specialist 4th Class Charles D. Bartlett, and Door Gunner Specialist 4th Class Charles R. Copeland in Bartlett’s aircraft, tail number 66-15227. With the addition of a third aircraft, what was a two-ship light fire team had become a three-ship heavy fire team.
Jerry R. Fry
Charles D. Bartlett
Thomas Wood (left) James L. Wittman (right)
Charles R. Copeland
Night flights were a regular occurrence for the Black Angels. We often covered medevacs; flew night searchlight missions along rivers searching for watercraft carrying enemy troops and supplies; supported infantry units in contact; and provided support to FSBs under attack. As a result, our flight crews were accustomed to the challenges of night flight. However, this night was unusually challenging: The moon had yet to rise, a lack of wind was causing battle-action smoke to remain in the contact areas, and ground fog was starting to roll in. While hamlets, tree lines, roadways, and streams were identifiable from the air, the lateral visibility at ground level was nearly zero.
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The unit being supported on this mission was Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 505th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division (C/1/505), commanded by Cpt. Paul H. Davin, call sign Charlie 6. Earlier that afternoon, the company had been inserted via air assault to establish a blocking position along an escape route of a North Vietnam Army force being pushed in their direction by the 1st Battalion, 501st Airborne Infantry (Geronimo), 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (1/501).
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After being inserted, one of the company's platoons started receiving sniper fire, and several men were wounded. When the rest of the platoon moved forward to assist, the sniper fire became automatic weapons fire from both their front and left flank. The platoon leader was mortally wounded, his radio operator (RTO) was killed, and his radio was disabled. Unable to communicate with his platoon leader, Cpt. Davin moved forward with his remaining platoons, but before long, ten of his men had been killed and seventeen wounded, causing him to call for gunship and medevac support.
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As the Black Angels made their way to C Company’s position, in the fading light, they observed a medevac helicopter off in the distance, making an approach to land. Suddenly, the medevac aborted its approach, and someone called over the radio that they were taking fire, a crew member had been hit, and they were heading for the aid station. Hearing this, Cpt. Fry immediately called the Medevac Operations Center and requested another medevac be dispatched. He then contacted Charlie 6 to advise him that another medevac was on the way, to get a situation report, and to have him explain his support requirements.
After reviewing official documents and eyewitness statements and conducting multiple interviews, I learned the following about what transpired that night after Black Angel 6 (Cpt. Fry) first contacted Charlie 6 (Cpt. Davin).
​​​Initially, after being briefed on the enemy situation, Cpt. Fry was hesitant to accept the fire support mission because of the low visibility and the enemy's close proximity to the friendly forces. He was also hesitant because another infantry company was close enough to C Company that their safety had to be considered as well (A/1/501). However, after discussing the situation with both Charlie 6 and the other company commander, Cpt. Fry told them his fire team would do their best to assist them.
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To ensure he understood the situation and that ground troops would not be endangered during the Black Angel live fire gun-runs, Cpt. Fry made a simulated gun-run using his searchlight over what he understood to be the target area. He then made a second searchlight pass to ensure his wingmen understood the line of attack and to confirm that neither company would be in danger. Once clearance was given by the ground commanders, Cpt. Fry made the first two live-fire gun-runs himself to create fires in the target area for his wingmen to adjust their fires on without endangering the infantry. After the full-fire team began attacking the target area, Cpt. Davin exclaimed over the radio, “Beautiful! Outstanding! Don’t come any closer! Right on the money." The result was that the enemy pressure on the company was reduced enough that they were able to recover their dead and bring all of their wounded into the company perimeter.
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After the gun-runs were completed, Cpt. Fry directed his wingman flying a rockets-only gunship to return to Camp Eagle while he and his other wingman remained on station to cover the medevac that had already reported he was inbound. Once the second medevac arrived, the pilot was briefed on the situation and then started his approach to a red-lensed flashlight being held by Cpt. Davin. However, during his approach, he became disoriented in the darkness and suddenly turned on his landing light, whereupon he started taking fire. Seeing this, Cpt. Fry called to the pilot to break hard right away from the gunfire; at the same time, Door Gunner Specialist Copeland, who could also see the muzzle flashes, returned fire, silencing the enemy guns. According to Cpt. Davin, the only thing that saved the medevac aircraft was Copeland’s accurate fire.​​​
Combat Damaged Aircraft from the 498th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)
L to R: Aircraft Commander: Warrant Officer Jim Siverd (Dustoff 30); Pilot: Warrant Officer Gene Manning (Dustoff 31); Medic: Specialist Jerry Pask; Crew Chief: unknown.
Photo from the cover of the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association (VHPA) Aviator Magazine, Issue 37-06, November/December, 2018
Once the medevac cleared the danger area, the pilot informed Cpt. Davin that they had taken enough hits that they needed to return to base to assess the damage. He also expressed doubt that another medevac could be dispatched tonight due to deteriorating weather conditions. However, if another medevac were sent, it would take at least an hour for it to arrive. Hearing this, Cpt. Fry contacted Medevac Operations once again and requested another medevac be sent. However, he was informed that another would not be sent until morning due to the previous two being damaged during landing attempts, and the weather conditions were now below the combat essential minimum requirements for another aircraft to take off.
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​When Cpt. Fry advised Cpt. Davin that it would be morning before another medevac would arrive, Cpt. Davin demanded the fire team not depart without his wounded. Despite knowing that it was unrealistic to expect an underpowered UH-1C gunship to rescue the wounded, the entire crew felt that they had no option but to at least attempt a landing. Therefore, seemingly disregarding the potential risks, Cpt. Fry told Cpt. Davin to prepare his most severely wounded; they would be landing to pick them up. With that, Mr. Wittman turned the helicopter position lights off, and they began a descent toward the red-lensed flashlight, hoping the same darkness that would make landing a challenge would also prevent the NVA from knowing exactly where to direct their fire. As they descended into the ground-level darkness, Cpt. Fry and Mr. Wittman worked together to monitor the aircraft instruments and make a controlled descent and landing. At the same time, Bartlett and Copeland were searching downward into the darkness, attempting to help the pilots spot the ground in time to slow their descent for a soft touchdown.
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Vietnam 1967: 1/Lt. Fry stands next to his UH-1C Gunship. This picture shows the size of the UH-1C cargo compartment, a mini-gun, and the rocket pods. After the takeoff with the first load of wounded, there were eight people in the cargo compartment for a time: the crew chief, gunner, five wounded, and the co-pilot.
​After landing, it was a little disconcerting to the crew that the infantrymen were crawling up to the aircraft, but Bartlett and Copeland still dismounted and moved to assist in bringing the wounded to the aircraft. Once back at the aircraft, they managed to squeeze five of the wounded into the tight space behind the pilots’ seats, which was already half full of ammunition cans secured to the floor. During that effort, the infantrymen asked Bartlett if he could leave them some M-60 machine gun ammunition because they were running low. After consulting with Cpt. Fry, who saw that as an opportunity to reduce their takeoff weight, Bartlett and Copeland turned their M-60 door gun ammunition over to the infantry.
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As soon as Bartlett gave the OK for takeoff, the pilots began easing their overloaded gunship forward and back into the air. No sooner were they off the ground than Copeland began calling for help as he was trying to hold on to two of the wounded who were about to fall out of the aircraft. Seeing the problem, Cpt. Fry put the aircraft into a sideslip to stop the airflow down that side of the aircraft from pulling the wounded out. At the same time, Mr. Wittman unbuckled his seatbelt and climbed into the back of the aircraft, and Bartlett came over from his side; between the three of them, they were able to get the wounded paratroopers secured back inside the aircraft​.​
Sp/4 Copeland had the following to say about the above situation in his post-flight statement.
After loading all the wounded we could fit inside the aircraft, we started out of the LZ, and I thought for a minute we would not make it.
At this time, I asked for assistance on my side of the aircraft because I was unable to do so sooner. I asked for help in securing two wounded who were virtually hanging on to me and out of the aircraft. One was situated half in and half out of my seat, while his wounded leg and the bottom half of his body were still located outside of the aircraft. A third man was sitting at the door, and, I believe, passed out from pain. Upon recognition of my call for help, WO Wittman, the pilot flying right seat, unbuckled his seatbelt and came over his seat to aid in pulling the wounded back into the aircraft. The crew chief, Sp/4 Bartlett, also made his way across the wounded to my side of the aircraft to assist me also. During this time, Cpt. Fry kept a cool head and put the aircraft into a side slip to keep the men from being pulled out of the aircraft by the slipstream of air flowing down my side of the aircraft. After getting the wounded secured, both returned to their stations.
After helping secure the wounded and returning to his seat, Mr. Wittman discovered that the overcast was forcing them to remain too low for visual navigation because of the darkness and speed of the aircraft. As a result, while Cpt. Fry flew the aircraft and focused on maintaining visual contact with the ground, Mr. Wittman contacted Medic Bravo at LZ Sally and requested they key their FM radio so he could use FM-homing to keep Cpt. Fry headed in the right direction. That did the trick until they were close enough to spot the flares being fired from the landing pad where the wounded were to be delivered.
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Once on the ground, while the wounded were being removed from the aircraft, the second wingman, who was still in the contact area, reported he was running low on fuel, so Cpt. Fry directed him to return to Camp Eagle. After that, a doctor came up to the aircraft and told Cpt. Fry they needed to return to the contact area as they had not gotten all the critically wounded and because the medevac helicopters were no longer available. Learning that, and with the full crew in agreement, they headed back into the darkness to search for Charlie Company’s red-lensed flashlight.
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Below are two instructive quotes, one from Crew Chief Sp/4 Bartlett’s after-action statement, which provides a view of what transpired in the back of the aircraft during the flight to the aid station and then back to Charlie Company's position. The second is from a statement made by the platoon leader of Charley Company’s 2nd Platoon, 2/Lt. Richard Underwood, in which he mentions the second landing to recover the wounded.
Statement of Sp/4 Bartlett​
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As I jumped into the aircraft, I told Cpt. Fry to take off. As we started out of the LZ, I was sure we would not get off the ground, and I still don’t see how we made it. We were so overloaded, and it seemed like an eternity before we were airborne.
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Just after we got off the ground, the gunner [Sp/4 Copeland] said he needed help as he had two guys hanging out the door on his side. The co-pilot, Mr. Wittman, came out of his seat, and I came over from my side of the ship; between the three of us, we managed to get the personnel inside the ship.
I then went back to the other side of the ship to see if I could do anything for the wounded; most of them were in great pain as far as I could see, and we were not able to help them much. A colored soldier lying on the floor looked so bad that I took off my shirt and fashioned it into a pillow for him to try and make him a little more comfortable. That and a little encouragement was all I could do for him.
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We took the wounded to LZ Sally Aid Station. The landing area was too tight for a gunship, but by a stroke of luck, Cpt. Fry had been there that afternoon, and his knowledge allowed him to make a smooth landing to the ground despite the weight of our overloaded gunship.
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We had carried out five people that first trip; that was quite a load for a gunship that still had part of a load of ammo left aboard. We tried to find the same area as quickly as possible [during our return for additional wounded]. We had to ask the ground commander to key his FM radio so we could home in on him. We arrived in the general area, but the visibility was so bad it was extremely hard to find the company. We flew around, flashing our searchlight off and on, asking them if they could see us.
Finally, they spotted us, but nobody wanted to show a light and give away their position. Cpt. Fry told them to either get a light out or we wouldn’t be able to help them. Once they did get a light out and we were able to find it, we started in to land.
____________________________________________________
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Statement of 2/Lt. Richard Underwood
Cpt. Davin, while talking to the returning gunship, tried to hand his flashlight to his RTO, telling him to go out and land a chopper. The eighteen-year-old freckle-nosed RTO from Mississippi looked at the flashlight as if being handed a rattlesnake. I grabbed the flashlight and said I would do it. I had been shot at all day, and maybe I figured my luck was good, but we needed to get our wounded out. I held the flashlight as high above me as possible and moved it back and forth. Cpt. Jerry Fry, the gunship fire team leader, landed for the second time that night, surrounded by the green tracer rounds of the NVA. After his crew chief and gunner had loaded the wounded, they gave us their remaining mini-gun ammunition for our machine guns before departing with the second load of wounded.
During their second lights-off landing approach, they did not spot the ground as early as they did on their first approach and struck the ground a forward glancing blow a short distance in front of the light. Luckily, sensing the ground was near, Mr. Wittman flashed the landing light on and off just in time for Cpt. Fry to see the ground and arrest their descent enough to cushion what became a ground strike. Unfortunately, when they struck the ground, Sp/4 Bartlett had already unhooked his seatbelt in preparation for dismounting and dropped his M-16 out of the aircraft when he grabbed a support post to steady himself.
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Sp/4 Copeland, the doorgunner, had the following to say about the return to C Company’s position.
After numerous attempts to locate his position, we were finally able to identify his blinking red light and to make an approach to his unit. Because of the low ceiling and extreme darkness, we struck the ground short of our objective, but because of the joint efforts of Cpt Fry and WO Wittman, we were able to land and pick up the other wounded. We touched down for the second time that night in the dimly-lit makeshift LZ.
The crew chief and I again dismounted to aid in the loading of the wounded. Again, we gave the ground troops more ammo from the ship, this time disarming one of our mini-guns to supply the badly needed ammo. This action left us with only M-16s for defense of our aircraft. Upon loading the critically wounded onto our aircraft, we tried to make it out of the LZ, and again we were faced with the darkness and the knowledge that we were an over-loaded gunship with nine lives aboard, but once more, Cpt Fry brought us out of the LZ.
​​After securing five more wounded, an uneventful takeoff was made, and they again made their way to the aid station, expecting to offload the wounded and return to Camp Eagle. However, the doctor appeared again and requested they take two of the wounded to the 22nd Surgical Hospital at Phu Bai. By now, fuel was becoming a concern, but as Phu Bai was near Camp Eagle, they agreed to take them there.
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With Bartlett and Copland holding drip bottles of plasma and comforting the wounded, they headed for Phu Bai. At Phu Bai, they needed a special VFR clearance from the Air Force control tower to enter their airspace because the airport was operating under instrument flight restrictions because of the poor visibility. After landing and turning the wounded over to the hospital staff, they headed for Camp Eagle, where they landed with their low-fuel warning light glowing. Thus ended the mission that Crew Chief Sp/4 Bartlett described in his after-action statement as an “unusual and rewarding mission.”
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Once on the ground, Cpt. Fry went to see his aviation company commander and then the battalion commander to report the loss of the M-16 during the second landing. Mr. Wittman, Sp/4 Bartlett, and Copeland inspected the aircraft for battle damage, refueled, rearmed, and went back on standby.
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Fifty years later, one of Cpt. Fry’s Officer Candidate School classmate, Clifford A. Gehrt, wrote the following about the crew's actions that night.​
A good analogy is that Cpt. Fry and his crew did the equivalent of diving on three separate hand grenades that failed to explode. The first was flying in adverse weather conditions below combat essential flight minimums to land in an unlighted landing zone with their lights off. The second was operating an overloaded helicopter gunship on the cutting edge of its design capabilities under adverse conditions, where one mistake could have been disastrous. The third was landing under the same enemy fire that had already damaged and forced two med-evac aircraft to abort their recovery efforts. Finally, after surviving those three figurative hand grenades and making it back to the safety of the rear area, they did it all over again when asked to return for more wounded.​​
Early the next morning, Cpt. Fry departed on R&R. When he returned two weeks later, he learned that Cpt. Davin was recommending him for the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH) through 82nd Airborne Division infantry channels and that he was being reassigned to the 101st Airborne Division staff as an assistant division aviation officer. A short time later, Cpt. Fry started processing the paperwork through 101st Airborne Division aviation channels to nominate Warrant Officer W-1 James L. Wittman for the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Specialists 4th Class Charles Bartlett and Charles R. Copeland for Silver Stars.
As for the award nominations, more than a year later, after they had returned to the States, Cpt. Fry was awarded a DSC, and Mr. Wittman a Silver Star. I have not been able to find out if Bartlett and Copeland received anything, but I do know that Sp/4 Charles Bartlett did not survive his tour in Vietnam. Four months after the above mission, flying in the same aircraft with Cpt. Fry’s replacement, he and the rest of the crew were all killed when they were shot down while covering another medevac in the A Shau Valley. (See Chapter 20: Losses Continue.)​
As Cpt. Fry was an infantry officer, he attempted to extend his tour in Vietnam to command an infantry rifle company, but under the umbrella of “we do not put pilots on the ground,” he was not allowed to extend for an infantry assignment. As a result, he extended to fill a pilot slot in the Aviation Section of the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. However, he delayed his extension until the 2nd Brigade Commander had agreed to give him command of an infantry rifle company if he extended to serve as a pilot in his aviation section. As a result, Cpt. Fry commanded Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 501st Airborne Infantry (Geronimo), 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Ironically, that was the same company he worried about accidentally firing into the night the Black Angels were supporting Cpt. Davin.
Charles D. Bartlett
Vietnam 1969
Command Group A/1/501st Airborne Infantry, 101st Airborne Division
For details on A/1/501’s experience with booby traps and concealed bunkers, click here: [Deathtrap Village]
While the information above came from official reports, eyewitness statements, and interviews I conducted, it does not do justice to the full story of what occurred that night. For that reason, I am including two items below. First is the statement of the ground commander, Cpt. Davin. The second is a memorandum for record prepared by our Black Angel company executive officer, which was included in the crew award nominations.
Statement of Captain Paul H. Davin
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1. On the afternoon of 4 April 1968, my company, C/1/505, made a combat assault with the mission of providing a blocking force to the north of the village of Ap Nam Phu, Thua Thien Province, RVN, with another element sweeping from south to north.
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2. After all the elements of the company had hit the LZ and began moving toward the village, the 1st platoon came under heavy fire from small arms, automatic weapons, RPGs, and mortars. One squad, the lead element of the first platoon, immediately sustained about four KIA and about the same number of wounded, including the platoon leader.
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3. I was immediately contacted by the squad leader and was given the situation. It was getting dark by this time, so I called for a dust-off to get the wounded out and a light fire team [gunships] to take the pressure off the company.
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4. By this time, we had suffered additional casualties, and the situation, as far as the wounded were concerned, was very critical. As darkness was almost on us, the first ship came in to attempt to evacuate the wounded. As he came in to land, he started to receive a heavy volume of enemy fire and departed without taking the wounded.
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5. As this aircraft started to leave, a fire team from the 101st Abn. Div. arrived. Because of the darkness, haze, smoke, and fog, it took approximately ten minutes for Cpt. Fry, the fire team leader, to pinpoint all of my elements. This he did by observing the flashlight I was carrying and by observing the tracers of my other elements as they fired into enemy positions. Cpt. Fry was very worried about accepting this mission because of the low visibility and because the enemy was in very close proximity to our front lines.
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6. He made two dry gun-runs using his searchlight, all the time drawing fire, to make sure he would not hit any of the American troops in the area. The gunships did a terrific job of knocking out some of the NVA positions in the village. Their fire was right on target, and they responded to every correction. All that I can say is that they were terrific. While they were hitting the village, they also provided cover for my men as they dragged the dead and wounded to safety to wait for another dust-off.
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7. When the second dust-off arrived, he asked me to mark the LZ for him, which I did with a small red light and Cpt. Fry tried to direct the dust-off in. Because of the darkness and the foggy conditions, he missed the right LZ and started to land in front of my position; naturally, the enemy opened up on him before he even reached the ground, and he took many hits but managed to get out without crashing. One of the gunships opened up on the enemy position when they started to fire on the dust off, and I would say this was the only thing that saved the aircraft.
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8. By this time, the situation was desperate. If I could not get some of the most seriously wounded troops out, they would surely die. Two aircraft had already tried to evacuate my wounded, and both were shot up by the enemy. The dust-off pilot had just told me that he didn’t think we would be able to get another dust-off helicopter.
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9. Cpt. Fry said, “I’ll get in there and get them out.” He then came into our position, all the time drawing heavy fire from the village. He managed to get all my wounded out and almost crashed doing so. One of his skids hit a grave, and I thought it was all over. He lost an M-16 but managed to hold onto his ship.
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10. He came in not once but twice, and the second time, he did it with no cover at all because his wingman had gone to his home base while Cpt. Fry was at the aid station with the first load of wounded. The aircraft crewmen who came to our aid displayed the highest degree of bravery, standing in an exposed position, heedless of the enemy fire, loading the wounded aboard the aircraft. When they finished, they gave all their small arms ammo to my men. This they did not once but twice that night, the second time unloading their mini-guns.
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11. The aircraft crewmen who came to our aid with their ordinance firing on the village to get us out of a jam were terrific; that is their job. However, when they risk their own lives to land a gunship in the dark while the enemy was shooting small arms, automatic weapons, RPGs, and mortars to save the lives of my men, and at the same time give us all of their small arms ammo, then that is valor above and beyond the call of duty.
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12. What these pilots and crewmen did for me and my company is truly an act deserving of the highest award for gallantry. I really cannot say enough in praise of these men—a trite cliche—they showed me what men are made of and how they cared for the infantry.
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13. Cpt. Fry, the leader of the fire team of gunships, was cool, calm, and professional in his every action. He is responsible for saving ten men that night. The total casualties that C Company suffered were ten KIA and seventeen wounded. Ten of the wounded were very serious. Captain Fry got all ten out that night. Had it not been for him, most of them would have died that night.
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Paul H. Davin
Captain, Infantry
Commanding
C/1/505 Abn. Infantry
The following memorandum for the record was prepared by our aviation company executive officer, Captain Francis Gniazdowski, at Camp Eagle in June 1968. It was included in the crew’s nomination packages but not in Cpt. Fry’s nomination package processed by the 1/505 Infantry.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B (Gen. Spt.) 101st Aviation Battalion
APO San Francisco 96383
SUBJECT: Aviation Aspect of Fire Team Mission 19 June 1968
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
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A review of all eyewitness statements reveals the following aviation aspects of the fire team mission in support of C/1/505 Infantry, 82nd Abn. Div., on the night of 04-April-1968.
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1. The close proximity of C/1/505 Infantry to the enemy position would have indeed made the fire support mission an extremely difficult task during daylight hours. However, this mission was accomplished during extreme darkness, with very limited lighting to identify friendly elements. During the gun-runs, enemy fire was suppressed, with no friendly troops being injured by the gunship fire. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the fire team leader not only had to identify the enemy and friendly positions but also had to brief and direct the fires of eleven other members of the fire team.
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2. Weather reports verify that the mission was performed in weather conditions that were far below those accepted by aviation personnel as combat essential weather minimums.
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3. Either one of the above-mentioned conditions would have given the fire team leader ample justification to refuse to accept the mission for safety reasons alone.
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4. The statements also indicate that the fire team leader exhibited a high degree of professionalism and understanding, being able to fully understand the tactical situation and coordinate with the ground commander[s] with minimum visual aids and directing the fire of all three ships, providing the much-needed air support without endangering the lives of the friendly forces.
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5. The door gunners of the fire team displayed the highest degree of professionalism in being able to suppress the enemy fire that caused extensive damage to the medevac helicopter and nearly cost the lives of the crew. The heavy enemy fire received by both medevac helicopters clearly illustrates the close proximity of the enemy to the friendly position.
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6. The fireteam leader, although fully aware of his responsibility for the safety of his crew and aircraft, landed his aircraft in a hot, unprepared area, without lighting and while under heavy enemy fire, in order to evacuate the seriously wounded personnel. The task was completely voluntary and far above and beyond the call of duty. The helicopter gunship [UH-1C] is designed to carry a maximum crew of four due to its critical weight limitations and relatively low power as compared to a medevac helicopter. The gunship, in addition to the crew of four, carried five critically wounded personnel out of that area on two occasions, which placed the aircraft in an extremely overloaded condition. This flight would have taken an exceptional degree of knowledge and professionalism, even under the most favorable flight conditions during daylight hours.​
Vietnam 1967: 1/Lt. Fry stands next to his UH-1C Gunship. This picture shows the size of the UH-1C cargo compartment, a mini-gun, and the rocket pods. After the takeoff with the first load of wounded, there were eight people in the cargo compartment for a time: the crew chief, gunner, five wounded, and the co-pilot.
7. The crew further endangered their lives by surrendering all of their machine gun ammunition to the infantry personnel, who were running low on ammunition, thereby limiting their own ability to return fire while evacuating the wounded.
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8. The pilots exhibited a high degree of professional flying ability by using an extremely difficult means of navigation while low level at night en route to the hospital area, necessitated by extremely poor weather.
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9. Any number of existing circumstances on that night would have given the fire team leader complete justification for refusing any portion of the mission. The successful completion of a mission of this nature, under the existing conditions that night, would appear to be almost impossible. Indeed, the entire crew exemplified an exceptional degree of courage and professionalism and performed duties far above and beyond the call of duty.
Submitted by:
Francis Gniazdowski
Cpt., TC
Executive Officer
On 27 May 1969, Warrant Officer James Wittman was awarded the Silver Star, downgraded from the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for his actions on 4 April 1968. Crew Chief Sp/4 Charles Bartlett and Door Gunner Sp/4 Charles Copeland were nominated for the Silver Star, but as of this writing, I do not know if either was awarded a Silver Star or if theirs were also downgraded.
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Although Captain Davin nominated Captain Fry for the Congressional Medal of Honor (CMH) due to his actions that night, the medal was downgraded to the DSC, the second-highest award for valor, surpassed only by the CMH. Captain Fry received the DSC on August 13, 1969.
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It is difficult for me to understand why Cpt. Fry’s CMH nomination was downgraded since his actions were clearly above and beyond the call of duty, as has been clearly indicated by the ground commander that submitted the nomination. Fifty-one years after nominating Cpt. Fry for the CMH, now Major Paul H. Davin (USA-Ret.) wrote the following about his 1968 nomination.
I have no idea how the award system works or why the decision was made to downgrade my nomination of Cpt. Fry for the CMH that I thought he deserved for his valorous action. It is difficult for me to believe that an Infantry Officer would have supported such a downgrade. The life of an infantryman in Vietnam was hard and very demanding, and he could be called upon to make the ultimate sacrifice at any time. However, in recognition of his willingness to sacrifice, it was understood that if he were wounded, no effort would be spared to evacuate him from the battlefield as quickly as possible. In this case, we had a helicopter gunship pilot who honored that commitment and saved the lives of my critically wounded infantrymen. In keeping that commitment, Cpt. Fry risked his own life and performed feats of valor beyond what anyone has a right to expect, and he did it two different times under almost impossible conditions that any aviator sitting on the review board should have realized were far above and beyond the call of duty and that there is no award high enough for a proper expression of this country's deepest gratitude.
​Finally, it needs to be said that Jerry R. Fry never asked for an upgrade and initially resisted recommendations by others to do so on his behalf. He went on to a very distinguished military career with the Army, dedicating his life to service for his country. He served his country for thirty years and retired as a Full Colonel in 1992.​
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During the very short life of B Company Black Angels gunships, from December 1967 to July 1968, the flight crews received numerous awards for valor, including:
Distinguished Service Cross
Silver Stars
Distinguished Flying Crosses
Bronze Stars with “V” Device
Air Medals with "V" Device
Numerous awards of the Purple Heart for wounds received during combat action with the enemy.
Black Angels Insignia
Designed by Black Angle Crew Chief Sp/5 Clifford Gaston.
Later, helicopter pilot Chief Warrant Officer Gaston.
The Rest of the Story
Fifty years after Cpt. Fry was awarded the DSC, a group of his fellow veterans and friends attempted to have his DSC upgraded to the CMH. Below is a memorandum detailing the group’s efforts between 2017 and 2020. It was prepared by the leader of that group, former First Lieutenant Clifford A. Gehrt.
See Part 3 of this website.
Copyright: 2024 Roger Lockshier
Republished with the permission of the author.